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This edition of the Schizophrenia Bulletin brings together
7 papers first presented at the conference ‘‘Phenomenol-
ogy and Psychiatry for the 21st century’’ held at the In-
stitute of Psychiatry, London, in September 2005. The
conference initially aimed to redress an imbalance in
training (both clinical and research) yet ended up attract-
ing speakers and participants from 5 continents and
capturing a wider mood in the profession.
Why is phenomenology regaining prominence at this
time? Should these developments be taken seriously?
Phenomenology’s Relation to Psychiatry
It is well know that phenomenology is a philosophical ac-
tivitythatexaminesthestructureofexperienceitself.Var-
ious accounts of this activity are outlined in this theme.
Whatislesswellknownisthedirectcontactphenomenol-
ogy had with the young field of scientific psychiatry; the
way phenomenological ideas influenced the way we ap-
proach, construct, and attempt to deal with mental life
and its pathologies.
One version of phenomenology in its psychiatric appli-
cation encouraged clinical description via empathic con-
siderationof the patient’sexperience. Thiswas toprovide
a theory-neutral set of descriptions from which the science
ofpsychiatrycouldbegin.KarlJaspersdrewonthisversion
in his descriptive method first outlined in 1911.
In a direct line of descent, Kurt Schneider described
personality disorders and depressive states using a strat-
ification of the emotional life that came from the
great phenomenologist Max Scheler. He also attempted
to operationalize a phenomenological notion about
schizophrenia—namely, that it could take us beyond
the reach of empathic description (Jasper’s ununder-
standability concept). These were his famous first-rank
symptoms. Like Jaspers, Schneider was directly engaging
with phenomenology.
Many of these descriptions formed the basis of John
Wing’s hugely influential present-state examination.
Likewise, early texts of the International Classification
of Diseases drew on similar accounts. But since then,
the tradition, even of Jasperian phenomenology, has
largely been lost from mainstream psychiatry. Not unlike
the constructs of psychodynamic psychotherapy and
more recently cognitivism, these descriptions took on
the appearance of solid objects that can be considered
outside the broader philosophical debate and history
of ideas (see Mullen in this issue.)
Moving Beyond Jaspers
Despiteitseclipsefromthemainstream,atraditionofphe-
nomenological psychiatry continued. Early writers, seek-
ing to move forward from Jaspers, sought to deepen
psychiatry’srelationtophenomenology.Thislistincludes
EugeneMinkowski,LudwigBinswanger,KurtSchneider,
Victor von Gebsattel, and Wolfgang Blankenburg. More
recent writers in this tradition have included Louis Sass
and John Cutting. Rather than considering psychiatric
phenomenology as simply a form of description, these
authorsseethephilosophicalphenomenologists(Husserl,
Heidegger,Scheler,andthelike)asofferingasetofdeeper
(often competing) concepts with which to make sense of
psychopathologyitself.Oftheearlierauthors,whatneeds
emphasizingisthebidirectionalrelationshiptheyhadwith
the philosophical movement of phenomenology. They
read and were read by the phenomenologists.
These psychiatric thinkers have argued that though
Jaspers first developed the theme of meaning in psycho-
sis, he left it impossibly broad. They have argued that the
Jasperian concept of theory-neutral description through
empathy is unclear and that his ununderstandability
criterion risks casting schizophrenic experience into an
inhuman light where physiological management and
research are all that seem possible. Patients with schizo-
phrenia, these thinkers argue, despite perplexing us
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105profoundly, keep arousing a sense of meaning. Hence,
conceptualizing schizophrenia as an ununderstandable
break from the human community is difficult to sus-
tain. In these respects, the Jasperian position is open to
criticism.
Constructive points are also made by these thinkers.
Primordialmeaninganditsmodes arewhat phenomenol-
ogy studies. Hence, it can inform and be informed by the
alterations of meaning that we see in psychopathology.
What Jaspers left broad can be made more specific. Em-
pathy can be better understood by linking it to the deeper
phenomenological category of ‘‘intersubjectivity.’’ Like-
wise, theory-neutral description can be better understood
by linking it to the more detailed phenomenological con-
cept of ‘‘asymbolic’’ seeing. And finally, ways out of the
meaning vs physiology schism are offered. One concept is
the notion of ‘‘being in the world’’ (pathologicalor other-
wise) that Binswanger regarded as foundational for the
discipline of psychiatry.
What a Load of Metaphysical Nonsense
Can there really be any use in mainstream 21st century
psychiatry reviving this complex conceptual and philo-
sophical heritage? The following objections might be
made to such a development.
1. The phenomena of psychopathology are epiphenom-
ena deriving from the underlying pathophysiological
processes. Once the pathophysiology is understood,
the phenomena become irrelevant.
2. The phenomena of psychopathology are faulty com-
putation deriving from the underlying faulty cognitive
processes. Once the cognitive processes are under-
stood, the phenomena become irrelevant.
3. Phenomenology is subjective. Scientific psychiatry
needs concepts that are objective.
However, before we accept these objections, it is worth
asking the following questions:
Firstly, has neuroscience met our expectations in psy-
chiatry, and how well explained are our successful
biological interventions (eg, drugs, Electroconvulsive
Thrapy) Do we really understand (and can we really
make our patients understand) the idea that abnormal
mental states are epiphenomena?
Secondly, within the cognitive paradigm, when we talk
aboutmeaning,doweunderstandwhatwemean—canwe
really derive semantics from syntax (the primary assump-
tion of this approach)? Do cognitive models of psycho-
pathology miss the being in the world mentioned above?
Andthirdly,doesnotobjectivemeasurementinpsychi-
atry have to be particularly careful about its assumptions
concerning validity? This would follow from the fact that
scientificpsychiatryisall aboutfinding objectivizationsof
subjective experience (an inherently difficult activity from
a conceptual point of view). Ignoring the ‘‘what it is like’’
of a mental illness—its phenomenology—risks under-
mining the very objectivity of psychiatry.
Phenomenology in Schizophrenia Bulletin
In this special issue, 7 writers who took part in the 2005
conference present different perspectives on the impor-
tanceofphenomenology.NancyAndreasongivesanover-
viewofthedemiseofphenomenologyintheUnitedStates.
She argues that training in validity has been traded off
against reliability. Paul Mullen and Nassir Ghaemi use
phenomenologicaltheoryindifferentwaystoinformclin-
ical research. Paul Mullen sees phenomenology and sci-
ence in a sort of dialectical relation to each other and
urges another phenomenological phase to revitalize our
psychopathological categories. Nassir Ghaemi argues
that phenomenology can shed light on key conundrums
in mood disorder, such as insight. Then, starting from
purephenomenology,GiovanniStangelliniandMassimo
Balleriniapplyqualitativemethodologytoinvestigateval-
ues in schizophrenia and how they may reflect a loss of
common sense. In a different vein, Peter Uhlhaas, Aaron
Mishara, and Kai Vogeley argue for the importance of
crosstalkbetweenphenomenologyandthecognitiveneu-
rosciences. Peter Uhlhaas and Aaron Mishara argue that
phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia reveal
perceptual abnormalities that are otherwise overlooked
bytraditionalcognitivescience.KaiVogeleyandChristian
Kupkelinkthephenomenologyoftimeconsciousnesswith
contemporary neuropsychological concepts. They high-
light evidence suggesting that a core deficit in schizophre-
niaisthewaytimeisconstituted.Bothpapersseektobuild
bridges between phenomenology and neuroscience and
seekpathwaysforfutureexperimentalwork.Finally,Peter
Chadwick brings phenomenology back to a plain talking
account of the experience of psychosis. He draws on his
own knowledge as both a sufferer and a scientist and
howtheintegrationofmeaningswithcauseshaspromoted
his own recovery.
All these authors are senior clinicians and researchers
working in various fields to solve problems in psychiatry.
Whether their uses of phenomenology are convincing is
for the reader to decide. From our perspective, as 2 train-
ing psychiatrists, phenomenology offers a philosophical
foundation for an apprenticeship in psychiatry. Without
it training risks become conceptually concrete, with less
opportunity for gaining helpful perspectives and new hy-
potheses.
The interest that has gathered around the conference
is perhaps an indication that psychiatry can prosper
as an intellectual and therapeutic force by reengaging
constructively with phenomenology. This is of course
an ongoing task.
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